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THE LESSER
HIPPIAS
A
DIALOGUE
OF
PLATO
CONCERNING
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
ERROR.

LONDON:

Printed by H. WOODFALL;

And Sold by W. SANDBY, in *Fleet-Street*; and R. and J. DODSLEY,
in *Pall-Mall*.

MDCCLXI.

[Price Two Shillings and Sixpence.]

THE LESSER

HIPPIAS

DIALOGUE

PLATO



VOLUNTARY

FOR

DOWN

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And sold by W. Sandby, in Finsbury, and H. and J. Dorman,

in Pall Mall.

MDCCLXXI

[Three Two Spelling and ...]

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ERROR

THE JEFFER

H I P P I A S

A

D I A L O G U E



VOLUME 1

TO
THE MOST NOBLE
WILLIAM, DUKE OF *DEVONSHIRE*,
LORD CHAMBERLAIN
OF HIS *MAJESTY*'S HOUSHOLD;

THIS TRANSLATION OF THE
LESSER HIPPIAS OF PLATO

Is inscribed,
With ALL POSSIBLE RESPECT,
by His GRACE'S
most obedient and
most humble Servant,

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

TO

THE
WILLIAM D. BROWN
LORD CHANCELLER

OF THE UNITED STATES

IN

CHIEF JUSTICE

OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

T H E
A R G U M E N T.

*I*N this Dialogue Hippias the Sophist bears the Highest of the Two subordinate Parts or Characters: from Him therefore it derives its¹ Name: and the Brevity of it, in Comparison with the Other between Socrates and the same Sophist, has occasioned it to be called The Lesser Hippias. — The Title prefixed to it in all the Editions of Plato, which is This, περὶ ψεύδους, concerning Lying or Untruth, is apparently defective; because it expresses only Part of the Subject: unless the Word Lying be there taken in the Sense put upon it by a late² Writer, so as to relate to every Part

¹ See the latter Part of the Prologue.

² Mr. Wollaston in his Religion of Nature delineated: where that very ingenious and learned Man makes Error, or Deviation from Rectitude, in Moral Actions, to consist in *acting a Lye*; that is, in acting as if the Nature of that Person or Thing, whom or which our Action concerns, were different from what it is: which in plain English, and agreeably to the Language of the Platonists, is the same thing as *acting with Incongruity and Impropriety*; or, as the Stoicks love to express themselves, *acting contrary to Nature*, our own, and that of other Things.

6 The A R G U M E N T.

Part of Human Conduct. But this being not the proper Sense of the Word, we have ventured to change the Title; and to assign such a one, as, we think, comprehends the Whole of the Subject; and, in as few Words, as are requisite to some Degree of Clearness, shows the Nature of it.—For in this Dialogue is argued a Point, which has been long the Subject of much Controversy, whether Error in the Will depends “on Error in the Judgment.” Socrates takes the Affirmative Side of the Question: and his End in so doing is to prove the Necessity of informing the Understanding in Moral Truths, that is, of acquiring Moral Science; together with the Necessity of maintaining the Governing Part within us in full Power over that which is Inferiour, that is, of acquiring Habits of Virtue: through Want of which Science, and of which Power or Virtue, the Philosopher insinuates, that Man is either led blindly or impelled inevitably into Evil.—This Design is executed in Three Parts.—The First is concerning Words: in which it appears from Inductional Reasoning, that all Untruth is owing either to some Ignorance in the Mind, that is, Want of Knowledge in those Things which are the Subjects of our Affirmation or Negation, or to some Passion of the Soul, Desire of Glory for Instance, prompting us to speak, either deliberately and with Design, like Hippias, or inadvertently and rashly, like Achilles, Untruths or Lyes.—The
Second

The A R G U M E N T. 7

Second Part is concerning Actions ; and proceeds in the same Way of Reasoning by Induction, to prove, that all Error in acting arises either from Ignorance or Weakness : seeing that in every Action, merely Corporeal, and also in the Energys or Works of every Art, when Faults are committed, such as are blameable, the Cause of this is either Defect of Skill to design well, or Defect of Ability to execute.—In the last Part, by much the shortest, but for which the other Two are intended by Plato, according to his ³ usual Manner, merely to prepare us, the Reasoning is Analytical ; and proves, that in Dishonest or Bad Men the Understanding is either unenlightened by Science, or overpowered and blinded by Passion, or else suffers in Both ways ; and therefore, that, with the Ignorance or Impotence of Mind under which they labour, they labour at the same time under a Necessity of doing Ill : from which Necessity they can be freed only by inward Light and Strength, that is, by Science and Virtue. Here we find the Sapiens sibi que Imperiosus of Horace, in a beautiful Passage of his Seventh Satyr, the 2d Book : so much of which, as relates immediately to our Purpose, we have thus paraphrased ;

Thy Master does, Himself, some Master serve ;
Some Impulse sets in Action every Nerve.

Think

³ Concerning Plato's Conduct in this respect, see the Argument of 10, page 11.

Think not the Puppet in his own Command;
 His Strings are guided by Another's Hand.—
 Who then is free? — who not by Passion fool'd,
 In every Motion is by Reason rul'd.
 To All, but Reason, He superiour, still
 Moves but as bids him his own better Will.

*Agreeable to This is that Doctrine of the Stoicks, derived immediately, it should seem, ⁴ from this Dialogue of Plato, " that
 " only the Wise Man is Free : " upon which Maxim the
 Fifth*

⁴ Plotinus also, the most ancient Platonist of Any whose Writings are now remaining, proves that only Mind or Intellect is truly Free; and that therefore Liberty of Will in Man, or his having his Actions in his own Power, τὸ αὐτεξέσιον, resides only in a Soul, whose inward Operations follow the Leading of Intellect or Mind, ἐν ψύχῃ κατὰ νῦν ἐνεργύσῃ. And at the End of his Argument he thus concludes, the Soul therefore becomes free through the Government of the Mind; pursuing thus, without Impediment or Hindrance, her Way to Good: Γίνεσθαι ἐν ψύχῃ ἐλευθέρα διὰ νῦν, πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν (πεύδουσα ἀνεμποδίστως. Plotin. Enn. 6. L. 8. C. 5, 6, and 7. Alexander Aphrodis. also, the oldest Interpreter of Aristotle extant, makes the Essence of Man's Freedom to consist in his being governed κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν, by the Judgment of his own Reason; and in acting κατὰ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν, from Rational Motives, or as he is prompted and excited by Reason. See his Treatise Περὶ εἰμαρμένης, §. 14, and 23. Ed. Lond. and Aristotle himself, Metaphysic. L. 9. C. 5. Epicurus seems to have been the First who imagined Human Liberty to consist in acting without any Motives at all, or at least independantly of any. To account for which wild way of acting, he supposes That uncertain and unaccountable Declination of Atoms,

The ARGUMENT. 9

Fifth Satyr of Persius is a lively Comment. But this being a Philosophical Paradox, Plato employs great Address, in the insinuating into the Mind a Truth, which our own Consciousness^s seems to contradict: for Who is there, not under Outward Restraint, and only influenced by Inward Motives, who does not think himself Free? Our subtle Philosopher therefore argues upon the Supposition of the Freedom of Will in Bad Men; and by thus arguing, proves an Absurdity, “that
 “Such, as do Evil wilfully, are Better Men than Those,
 “who do Evil without intending it.” The Consequence of which is This, that the Argument proceeded upon a False Supposition; for that None do Evil with a clear-sighted and distinct View, and that in Bad Men the Will is not Free. — Thus much only seems necessary, for opening the concealed Manner, Design, and Method of this Dialogue. A more explicit and particular Account of them will appear in the Process of our Notes. — The Introduction is too natural and
 easy

Atoms, or their Deviation from the ordinary Course of Nature, for which he is justly reprehended by Cicero in many Parts of his Philosophical Works. Yet this Notion, or Fancy, of Epicurus, concerning the Liberty of the Will, absurd as it is, hath been espoused by some Modern Writers of Great Name; though without His or indeed any other ingenious Contrivance, to obviate the Absurdity.

^s See Note 389. to the Dialogue.

10 The ARGUMENT.

easy to want any Explication. — The Outward Form of the Dialogue is simply Dramatic: and as to its Genius, it may perhaps not improperly be said to be of the Confuting Kind; for we would not, unless obliged by the Necessity of Reason, chuse to differ from other Writers, or depart from Ancient Authority, by which it is pronounced Anatreptic. What Ground there is, however, for referring it to some other Kind, will easily appear to the Readers of our Synopsis.

PER-

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

S C E N E,

THE SCHOOL OF PHIDOSTRATUS.

The Conversation, here related, was held presently after *Hippias* had finished the Exhibiting or public Reading of that Dissertation of his, so highly celebrated by Himself in the larger Dialogue of His Name, (Page 44.) and upon the same Spot of Ground, which had been the Scene of his Lecture. This is evident from many Circumstances. In the first place, *Eudicus*, who is there mentioned as the Patron of *Hippias*, and Promoter of that Exhibition in particular, sustains the same Character in this Dialogue. He opens it with an Air of Triumph upon the Success of *Hippias*, which appeared in the Applause paid him by his Audience: and whenever he speaks afterwards, he takes the Air and Style of a Patron, one of that Kind who are humble and ignorant Admirers. — It is probable that he stayed behind, one of the last of the Assembly, on purpose to have an Opportunity of inviting and leading the Orator to his House; to feast there together, upon his coming off so triumphantly; as the Custom is in modern times upon similar Occasions. — Farther, it appears from that Passage of *the Greater Hippias* before cited, that *Socrates*, with Such of his Philosophic Friends

EUDICUS.

WHENCE comes it, Socrates, that you are so silent; when Hippias here has been exhibiting so finely and so copiously? Why do you not join the rest of the Audience in praising his Dissertation; or, at least, make some

as Himself should chuse, was, at the particular Request of *Hippias*, to make Part of the Audience at his intended Exhibition. 'Tis reasonable therefore to suppose Them to be admitted without paying their Quota of the Contribution-Money. Now this Circumstance exactly tallys with what we find in this Dialogue. For, not to insist on the Improbability that *Socrates* should have been present without such Special Invitation; it accounts for the tarrying behind of *Socrates* and his Friends, out of Civility to *Hippias*, who probably had conducted and introduced them to the Place appointed for the Exhibition. — That *Socrates* was at this time accompanied by some of his Followers in Philosophy, is plain from the first Speech of *Eudicus*; at the Conclusion of which he addresses *Socrates* in the Plural Number, meaning Him and his Friends. — One Argument more, to prove that the Exhibition of *Hippias*, which gave Occasion to this Dialogue, was the Same with That promised in the *Greater Hippias*, arises from the Nature of the Dissertation itself. For the Characters of the Heroes in *Homer's Iliad* were drawn in This which he had been exhibiting, as we learn from the following Dialogue; and it appears from the Subject, the Title, and Introduction of the Dissertation promised, that a Description of those very Characters made a considerable Part of it. See Note 33. to the *Greater Hippias*. — Remarkable Instances, all these, of *Plato's* exact Fidelity in the Dramatic Circumstances of his Dialogues, if true; or of his Accuracy and exquisite Judgment in adapting them one to another and to Probability, if they are feigned.

some Objections to it, if there was any thing in it which you disapproved? — All the Company too are now departed, and We left by our Selves; We, who would claim an especial Right to share in all Philosophic Exercises.

SOCRATES.

It would give me Pleasure, Eudicus, I assure you, to ask Hippias a Question or two, relating to a Subject, which he has just now been treating of, taken out of Homer. For I have heard your Father Apemantes say, that the Iliad of Homer was a finer Poem than his Odyssey; and as far surpassed it in Excellence, as the Virtue of Achilles surpassed the Virtue of Ulysses. For those two Poems, he said, were purposely composed in Honour of those two Heroes; the Odyssey, to shew the Virtues of Ulysses; the Iliad, those of Achilles. Concerning this very Point then, I should be glad, if it pleases Hippias, to ask his Opinion; What he thinks of those two Persons, and Whether of them in His Judgment was the Better Man. For his Exhibition, besides containing a great Variety of other Matters, displayed much Learning in the Poets, and particularly in Homer.

EUDICUS.

There is no Doubt, but Hippias, if you propose a Question to him, will condescend to give an Answer.—Will you not, Hippias, answer to any Question, which Socrates shall propose to you? or what other Course will you take in the Affair?

Hip-

HIPPIAS.

¹ I should take a shameful Course indeed, Eudicus, should I decline answering to any Question, put by Socrates; I, who never fail my Attendance at the Olympic Games; and, quitting the Privacy of Home, constantly present myself in the Temple there, to dissert before the General Assembly of the Grecians, upon Any of the Subjects, which I have then ready for Exhibition, such as shall be chosen by the Audience; and to answer to Any Question, which any Man shall think fit to ask.

SOCRATES.

Happy is the Situation of your Mind, Hippias, that, as often as the Olympic Festival returns, you can ² proceed to the

¹ It is observed in Note 2. to the *Io*, and Note 3. to the *Greater Hippias*, that the usual Manner of *Plato*, in his Dialogues, is to open the Character of each Person, in the Beginning or first Speeches of his Part; a Manner, worthy the Imitation of all Dramatic Poets. The most striking Feature in the Character of *Hippias* is Vanity, or the Desire of false and vain Applause: accordingly, it is here, in the very Outset of the Dialogue, shown in a strong Light. But there is, besides, a peculiar Reason for displaying it in the Beginning of This Particular Dialogue, because the Display of *Hippias's* Vanity, and of the Influence That Vanity had upon his Conduct, makes a Material Part of the Subject and Design. See the *Argument*, page 6; and Note 2/2. to the Dialogue.

² That is, when he was going to engage in those Voluntary Combats or Contentions between the Sophists, to prove Which of them could make the finest Exhibition. The Decision of these seems to have been left to that judicious Audience of theirs, the Multitude; who promulgated their Sentence, we presume, in their usual way, by bestowing a more or less loud Roar of Applause, in proportion as they were more
or

the Temple with a Soul so full of Alacrity and Hope, thro' Consciousness of Wisdom. I should much wonder, if any one of the Athletic Combatants, on that Occasion, marched to the Engagement with half that Security and Confidence in the Powers of his Body, which You, according to your own Account, have in the Abilities of your Mind.

HIPPAS.

I have Reason, Socrates, to entertain such Confidence. For since the time, when I first contended for a Prize in the Trials of Skill at the Olympicks, I have never met with a Man my Superior in Any which I engaged in.

SOCRATES.

The Reputation of your Wisdom, Hippas, will be a fair Monument of Glory to your Family and Country. — But what say you to Our Question concerning Achilles and Ulysses? Whether of the Two, think you, was the Better Man; and in what Respects? For, amidst the Multitude of People, who were within, thronging about you at your Exhibition, I missed hearing some Part of what you said; and, though desirous of asking you to repeat it over again,

I

or less pleased with Each of the Combatants in these bye-Battles. For, as it is certain, that These made no Part of those solemn Combats or Competitions at the *Olympic* Festival, according to its original Institution; so neither do we suppose them in the Number of those added afterwards, those in the Liberal Arts and Sciences. See Note 5. to *Io*. 'Tis more probable, that the Sophists, with a View of spreading their Fame wider, exhibited on these Occasions, *gratis*, to the *Publick*, the most approved of their Dissertations made for *Private Exhibition*: for some Account of which, see Note 13. to the *Greater Hippas*.

I suppressed that Desire, on account of the Greatness of the Croud, and because I would not interrupt your Dissertation. But since we are reduced to so small a Number, and since Eudicus here encourages me to ask you, give me a precise and clear Account of what you then said of those two Heroes, and what Distinction you made between their Characters.

HIPPIAS.

Well, Socrates ; I am willing to inform you, more precisely and distinctly than I did in my Exhibition, what my Sentiments are, concerning Those Heroes, and Others beside. — I say then, that Homer has made Achilles superior in Virtue to all the Grecians who were at the Siege of Troy, Nestor superior in Wisdom, and Ulysses in Cunning.

SOCRATES.

Ah, Hippias ! Will you grant me one Favour more ? and That is, not to laugh at me, if I am slow in apprehending what you say, and importune you with frequent and repeated Questions. Will you endeavour, on the contrary, to give me mild and gentle Answers ?

HIPPIAS.

Since I profess the instructing Others in the Knowledge of those very Things which are the Subjects of your Inquiry, and think That Knowledge so rare, as to deserve the being well paid for, it would be unfair and dishonorable in Me, Socrates, not to pardon Your Ignorance, and give a mild Answer to your Questions.

So-

SOCRATES.

Very fairly and honorably spoken. — You must know then, that when you said, Achilles was made by Homer superior in Virtue, I seemed to apprehend your Meaning: as I also did, when you told me, that his Nestor was made superior in Wisdom. But when you farther said, that the Poet had made Ulysses superior in Cunning, — what you meant by This, to confess to you the Truth, I am intirely ignorant of. — Possibly I may apprehend your Meaning better by your Answer to this Question — Is not Cunning Part of the Character of Achilles, as drawn by Homer?

HIPPIAS.

Nothing like it; but the Height of Simplicity. For in the Ninth Book of the Iliad, where Achilles and Ulysses are introduced in Conversation together, Achilles, addressing himself to Ulysses, speaks thus,

³ *Son of Laertes, Progeny of Jove!*
Subtle thy Wit, Ulysses, and thy Brain
Full of Devices various: but to Me
Plain Speech belongs; and bluntly to declare

My

³ It must be remembered, that we have professed to translate the Passages, taken out of *Homer*, not immediately from the Poet, but from *Plato*. Now in these Verses, as here cited, besides other various Readings, there is one whole Line omitted; which, though of Importance in the Poem, is insignificant to the Design of *Hippias* in citing the Passage.

D

*My Mind, my Meaning, and my fix'd Resolve.
 Not the black Gates of Hades are to Me
 More hostile or more hateful, than the Man
 Whose Tongue holds no Communion with his Heart.
 Thus then the secret Purpose of my Soul
 I tell thee—in no fruitless Words; the Deed
 Shall follow. —*

In these Verses we see the Character of Each of those Heroes: we see Achilles sincere and simple, Ulysses false and cunning. For Achilles is made the Speaker of these Verses, and to Ulysses are they spoken.

SOCRATES.

Now, Hippias, I am in some Hopes of understanding what you mean. False you call Cunning, it seems; and a Cunning Man, with You, I find, is a Man of Falshood.

HIPPIAS.

Exactly so, Socrates. And Homer accordingly has made Ulysses a Man of that very Character, in many Places both of the Iliad and of the Odyssey.

SOCRATES.

Homer then, it seems, was of Opinion, that the Man of Truth was a Man of different Character from the Man of Falshood.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, Socrates. How should it be otherwise?

So-

SOCRATES.

And are You of the same Opinion then, your Self, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

Most certainly. For it would be of sad Consequence, to have those two opposite Characters confounded.

SOCRATES.

Homer then let us leave out of the Question: it being impossible for us to ask Him, what he had in his Mind when he wrote those Verses. But, since You appear to second and support his Cause, and to entertain the same Sentiments with those which you attribute to Him, do You answer at the same time for Both, for the Poet and your Self.

HIPPIAS.

So it shall be. Ask any Question then, whatever you think fit; — only let it be brief.

SOCRATES.

* By Men of Falshood, do you mean Men who are under some such Kind of Inability to certain Actions, as Men who are Sick labour under? or do you mean Men of Abilitys and Powers for some or other Peformance?

D 2

HIP-

* Plato, in this and the Questions which follow, informs us what are the *Sources of Vice and Moral Evil*. The First is some *Disorder in the Body*, obscuring the Light of the Mind, or obstructing the Operation of its Facultys. Another is some *Defect in the Natural Powers of the Understanding*. A Third is *Want of Science*: and the Fourth, *Want of Virtuous Habit and Practice*.

HIPPIAS.

I mean Men, who have Powers, and those very strong ones too, for many Purposes, but particularly, to deceive Others.

SOCRATES.

The Cunning then, it seems, according to Your Account, are Men of strong Powers and Abilitys. Are they not?

HIPPIAS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

Is it through Folly, and Want of Understanding, that they are cunning and deceitful? or is it through Artfulness and Understanding—of a certain Kind?

HIPPIAS.

Through Artfulness in the highest Degree, and Depth of Understanding.

SOCRATES.

They are Men of good Understanding then, it seems.

HIPPIAS.

They are in no Want of Understanding, by Jove.

SOCRATES.

Since they have Understanding then, are they ignorant of what they are about? or do they know it?

HIPPIAS.

They know well enough what they do. And through this very Knowledge it is, that they are so wicked.

So-

SOCRATES.

With this Knowledge then, which they are Masters of, can they want Discipline or Skill? or do they abound in it?

HIPPIAS.

They have Discipline and Skill very sufficient for Their Purpose, that is, to deceive.

SOCRATES.

Hold now: let me recollect All that you have said. You assert, that Men of Falshood are Men of Abilitys, Understanding, Knowledge, and Skill;—that is, in those Subjects, in which they deceive.

HIPPIAS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And that Men of Sincerity and Men of Falshood, are different Kinds of Men, and of quite opposite Characters One to the Other.

HIPPIAS.

I own this Assertion also.

SOCRATES.

Well then; amongst the Men of Abilitys and Skill, Some, it seems, are Men of Falshood, according to Your Account.

HIPPIAS.

Most true.

SOCRATES.

When you say now, that Men of Falshood are Men of Abilitys and Skill in certain Respects, do you mean that they

they are able to deceive, if they are willing so to do? or think you that they want Ability for the Purpose of deceiving.

HIPPIAS.

I think, they have Ability for that Purpose.

SOCRATES.

To sum up the Whole then; Men of Falshood are Men who have Skill and Ability to deceive.

HIPPIAS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

The Man therefore, who has no Ability or Skill to deceive, cannot be a Man of Falshood, or a Deceiver.

HIPPIAS.

Very Right.

SOCRATES.

⁵ Whether is That Man able to do what he wills, who can exercise his Ability at whatever time he chuses? that is, supposing him not hindered by some Disease, or ⁶ other Thing of that Kind: but in the same manner, I mean, as
You

⁵ This Sentence is evidently intended by *Plato* as a *Question*, not as a Positive Consequence from any thing before said. Yet all the Editors have given it this wrong Turn, by falsely printing ἀρα instead of ἄρα. And all the Translators were in this, as in most other Places, misled by the erroneous Printing of the *Greek* Text.

⁶ That is, any Outward Impediment. In the Vulgar Use of the Words, *Power* and *Liberty*, the Absence of *Outward* Obstacles and Impediments only is considered.

You are able, whenever you chuse it, to write My Name. Say you not, that Every such Man is Able, who has the like Power in Other Cases?

HIPP I A S.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Tell me now, Hippias; are not You well versed in Numbers and Accounts?

HIPP I A S.

Perfectly well, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Were a Man to ask you then, "How many are thrice seven Hundred," would you not answer that Question, if you chose so to do, perfectly well, and with the utmost Readiness?

HIPP I A S.

I certainly should.

SOCRATES.

And That, because your Ability and Skill are excellent in Subjects of that Kind.

HIPP I A S.

True.

SOCRATES.

Do you excel in Ability and Skill only? or is your ⁷ Virtue equal to your Ability and Skill — with respect to the same Subject, that is, Numbers and Accounts?

HIP-

⁷ Socrates here means *Justice*, particularly that Part of it which is called *Veracity*.

HIPPIAS.

It is, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

You are perfectly well able then upon these Subjects to speak the Truth. Are you not?

HIPPIAS.

So I imagine.

SOCRATES.

But what ; are you not equally able to speak Untruths upon the same Subject ? Answer me now, Hippias, as you did before, with a generous Freedom and Openness. Were a Man to ask you then, “ How many are thrice seven Hundred ? ” would not You be the best able to impose on Others, and always to give Answers alike Untrue upon that Subject, if you had a constant Inclination to impose Falseness for Truth, and never at any time to give a Right Answer ? or would the Unskilled in Computations be better able to deceive than You are, if they were so inclined ? ⁸ Might not the Ignorant, however desirous of persisting in False Answers, frequently happen to stumble on such as were True, out of meer Ignorance ? But You, who have Skill, should you also have an Inclination to deceive, would you not always invariably answer wrong ?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly ; the Case is as You represent it.

So-

⁸ In the Original here we certainly ought to read ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς, and not ἢ (or) as it has been hitherto printed, and accordingly translated.

SOCRATES.

Now the Man of thorow Falshood, is he a Deceiver in Other Cases only, but not so in Numbering and Computing?—Would he not deceive Others, when Numbers and Computations were the Points in Question?

HIPPIAS.

° By Jove, would he.

SOCRATES.

Let us suppose then, Hippias, some certain Person to be a False Man, or a Deceiver, upon the Subject of Numbers and Computations.

HIPPIAS.

Well.

SOCRATES.

What Kind of Person must he be? In order to be a Deceiver, must he not, as You your self just now acknowledged, have Abilitys to deceive?—For as to any other Man, who wanted those Abilitys, You admitted, if you remember, that Such a one would never be a good Deceiver.

HIPPIAS.

I remember, we agreed in This.

SOCRATES.

Was it not proved just now, that You your Self was in the highest Degree capable of deceiving Others, by False Information, upon the Subject of Numbers and Accounts?

HIP-

° *Numbers and Accounts* being the chief Articles, in which Bad Men are guilty of Fraud and Falshood.

E

HIPPIAS.

In This too we agreed.

SOCRATES.

And are you not in the highest Degree capable of giving True Information upon the same Subject?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

¹⁰ One and the same Person therefore has Abilitys, beyond other Men, to give either false or true Information upon the Subject of Numbers and Accounts : and a good Arithmetician is this Person.

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Who appears then, Hippias, to be the ¹¹ Man of Falshood, and the Deceiver, with regard to Numbers and Accounts?

¹⁰ Both Members of this Sentence, in the *Original*, are by all the Editors erroneously, as we apprehend, made *Interrogative* ; and are so translated by *Serranus* and *Bembo*. The other Versions, in this Place, concur with Ours.

¹¹ *Aristotle* observes, that *Plato* here makes Use of a Paralogism, or Sophistical Way of Arguing. For by ψευδής, or a *Man of Falshood*, *Plato*, says he, means a *Man* δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι, *Capable of speaking Untruths* : whereas the Word properly signifys a *Man* εὐχερῆς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων [sc. ψευδῶν] λόγων, μὴ δὲ ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸ, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις ἐμποιητικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, *Apt to speak Falsities thro' Choice, and with Intention to deceive, and to beget in Others false Notions of Things.* *Aristot. Metaphysic. L. 5. C. 29.* And Such a Man, 'tis true,

is

counts? Is it any Other than the good Arithmetician? For He it is, who is the most Able. And the Same Man is also the True Accountant.

HIPPIAS.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

¹² You see then, that it belongs to the Same Man to be a Man of Falshood and a Man of Truth on Such Subjects; and that the Man of Truth is not a Better Man in this respect, than the Man of Falshood. For indeed he is the Same Person; so far is he from being One of Opposite Character, as You just now imagined.

HIPPIAS.

It appears so in This Case, I own.

E 2

So-

is the Subject of the present Dispute between *Socrates* and *Hippias*. But 'tis an innocent Piece of Sophistry; since it is not employed for the Purpose of deceiving Any, but for that only of discovering Truth; and turns into just Reasoning, when the Inference comes afterwards to be drawn from all the Instances enumerated; as will be shown in Note 13. *Aristotle* does not condemn *Plato* as guilty of arguing unfairly, or of putting off One Sense of the Word for Another; but, as he treats, in that Chapter of his *Metaphysics*, concerning the various Meanings of the Words *False* and *Falsity*, he produces from this Passage of *Plato* a singular Instance of an improper Use of the Term $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$, *False*, when applied to Man.

¹³ In this Sentence *Socrates* makes the Application of his first Instance, to prove the Truth of his General Position. We have therefore, with all the Translators, except *Serranus*, given it the Air of an absolute Assertion; contrary to the printed Editions of the *Greek*, in which it is turned into a Question.

SOCRATES.

Shall we try how it appears in Other Cases?

HIPPIAS.

With all my Heart ; if You chuse to go on to Others.

SOCRATES.

Have not You great Skill in Geometry?

HIPPIAS.

I have.

SOCRATES.

Well then ; is it not so in Geometry ? Is not One and the Same Person capable of giving either True or False Information concerning Diagrams ?

HIPPIAS.

I admit, he is.

SOCRATES.

Is any Other Person beside Good at Diagrams ?

HIPPIAS.

No other.

SOCRATES.

A good and skilful Geometrician then is equally capable in Either way above other Persons. And if there be any excellent Deceiver upon the Subject of Diagrams, it must be Such a Man. For He has Abilitys to deceive : whereas the Bad Geometrician is wanting in those Abilitys. So that neither in This Case can the Man, who has no Abilitys to deceive, ever be a Deceiver or Man of Falshood, as You before admitted.

HIP-

HIPPIAS.

You are right.

SOCRATES.

Farther now let us consider a Third Case, that of Astronomy; in which Science you have a still deeper Knowledge than you have in Those mentioned before. Is it not true, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Does not the Same Thing then hold good in Astronomy?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis probable, that it does, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

In This Case therefore it is the Good Astronomer, who is, above all Others, the Man of Falshood; He, who is able and well qualified to deceive. For it cannot be the Man who is ignorant in Astronomy: because Such a one is unable and unqualified for that Purpose.

HIPPIAS.

It appears so.

SOCRATES.

One and the Same Man therefore, in Astronomy also, is the Man of Truth and the Man of Falshood.

HIPPIAS.

So it seems to be, I confess.

So-

SOCRATES.

Now, Hippias, let us proceed to consider, in general and at large, ¹³ through all the Arts and Sciences, if there be

¹³ Whenever *Plato* brings Instances from the Mathematical Sciences, in order to prove or to illustrate any Truth running through them All, he does it always with a View of leading the Mind upward from Them to that Master-Science, That from which they receive their Principles, the Science of Mind; or at least to its immediate and noblest Offspring, that of Morals. See particularly his *Theatetus*, *Republick*, and *Epinomis*. We make this Observation here, to show the Scope of the Argument now used by *Socrates*. The small Company about him, All of them, except *Hippias* and *Eudicus*, were his own Disciples, and of his intimate Acquaintance: consequently, they were used to this Method of Reasoning in the Discourses of their Master. It was easy for Them therefore to apply the Instances, which he brought from the lower Sciences, agreeably to His Intention; and to infer from thence, that, if his present Argument were just, it would hold good in those higher Sciences. But the Absurdity of This must have been clearly apparent to them. For they knew, that the truly Wise and Good Man was with a full and free Choice attached to Truth; and consequently, where Veracity was concerned, was indeed *μη δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι*, Incapable of uttering Falsitys, or Untruths in a Moral Sense; and that in such Cases, *ψευδής*, a Man of Falshood, in *Plato's* Sense of the Word, was the Same with *ψευδής* in *Aristotle's* Sense of it, or *ψεύδωλος*, a Man given to speak Falsitys, and was the Reverse therefore of the Man of Truth. Hence, they saw, it followed, that, contrary to the Account given by *Hippias*, the False Man, or Deceiver in Words, was under some Natural Inability either of Body or of Mind, or was ignorant and void of the Best Science, or wanted Skill and Experience in the Art of Human Life, that is, *Practic Virtue*. See Note 4.—*Aristotle* rightly observes, that *Plato* produces these Instances of Falshood, in the Way of Induction, to prove the same Thing universally to be true of all Moral Evil. The

be any Case, in which that Position fails of being true. You must be a competent Judge of this, because Your Knowledge is Universal, and You are Master of more Arts than any Man living : ¹⁴ as I have heard You your Self declare,

Inference therefore is, that no Man is a Wicked or Bad Man *ἐκὼν*, with a clear-sighted and free Choice, but *ἄκων*, through the Power of some Evil Necessity.

¹⁴ *Socrates*, to put his Meaning beyond all Doubt with the Intelligent Part of his Audience, presents to their View next, in a very strong Light, the Character of *Hippias* himself, as full of false Boasting and vain Pretensions, which in Him were clearly the Effects of a total Ignorance in Moral Science. He had been, it seems, though probably but for a short Time, (see Note 9. to the *Greater Hippias*) a Disciple of *Hegesidamus*, or, as he is called by *Jamblicus*, (in *Vit. Pythag.* Cap. ult.) *Agesidamus*, a *Pythagorean* Philosopher of *Metapontum* in *Lucania*; who taught, that the Perfection, End, and Happiness of Man consisted in *αὐτάρκεια*, *Self-Sufficiency*: but *Hippias* was so blind, it seems, to the true Meaning of that sublime Doctrine, and so stupid with regard to Truth, whether Metaphysical or Moral, as to imagine, that the being able to furnish himself from Himself with all the Conveniencys and even Ornaments of Life, and not to be indebted to any other Artists for such as their respective Arts afford, was the Self-Sufficiency recommended by the Philosopher. See *Quintilian.* *Inst. Orat.* L. 12. C. 11. where that most judicious Writer seems to have accounted for the Conduct of *Hippias* from this ridiculous Error of his. For in order to attain Self-Sufficiency, *Hippias* aimed at acquiring Skill in all the several Arts requisite for that Purpose; and, falling far short of an Acquisition which is beyond the Powers of any One Man, he yet arrogantly pretended to it, through a Desire of being admired by the Multitude, and for Want of that True Self-Sufficiency, taught by *Hegesidamus*. To understand which, it may be necessary in this Place to add the following Supplement to that slight Sketch of Ancient Philosophy in Note 6. to the

Greater

clare, at some of ¹⁵ the Tables in the Assembly-Hall; where you were setting forth in ample Detail, and glorying in, the
Variety

Greater Hippias. — In the Days of *Thales* the *Ionian* arose *Pythagoras*; who in the Southern Parts of *Italy*, where *Grecian* Colonys had settled, founded a Sect of Philosophers, from their Country called *Italic*. The chief Object of their Philosophy was the Knowledge of *Mind*; which they considered as the *First-moving Principle* in Nature, and the *Fountain* of all *Action*; moving the Soul to act with a *View* always to some *End*, which *End* always is some *Good*. They held, that, as the *Universe* was *perfect* and *complete*, actuated by *Soul* under the Direction of *Mind*, this *Universal Mind* was *αὐτοτελής*, that is, had in *Himself* his own *End*, the Possession of all *Good*, and was *sufficient* to his own perfect Happiness: the *Universal Soul* therefore acted only for the Sake of producing *Good* to *Particular Beings*, as many as was possible, and of communicating to *Particular Minds* the *Happiness* of *its own*. Now This arising from its *Self-Sufficiency*, *Independance*, and the Contemplation of all Being and Beauty within its Self; the great Points of the *Pythagorean Moral* were to free Man from his Dependance on Things out of Himself, to purge his Soul from those Passions by which he is attached to them, and to remove his Life from those incumbring Pursuits, which hinder the *Contemplation* of *Truth*, and hide the *View* of Archetypal and True *Beauty*. Accordingly, these Philosophers taught, that the *End* of Man was *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ*, a *resembling* of *God*: which *Hegefidamus* explained by *αὐτάρκεια*, *Self-Sufficiency*: and his Explication is confirmed by what *Socrates* in *Xenophon* teaches, (*Mem. L. I. pag. 79. Ed. Simpson.*) that “to want Nothing is peculiar to the Divine Nature; and to have the Fewest Wants is approaching to it the nearest.” This *Self-Sufficiency*, by which a Man becomes independant; and is free, like *God* himself, to do *Good* to All; is the same Thing also with that *Freedom of the Soul*, the Desire of which to raise in his Disciples is the ultimate End of *Plato* in this Dialogue.—

¹⁵ The *ἀγορά*, or Place where the People met, and voted in their General Assemblys, was the Place likewise of Exchange. For at certain

Variety of your valuable and rare Knowledge. You there told us, that you went once to the Olympic Festival, with your Attire, and every Thing which you had about you, All the Making of your own Hands. In the first place, that the Seal-Ring, which you wore on your Finger, for you began with That, was your own Work, proving thus your Skill in cutting Intaglios. Beside That, you had another Seal of your own engraving: ¹⁶ a Strigil too, and an Un-
tain Hours of the Day Mercantile Business was here transacted: and at certain other Hours the Shops within it all around were opened, and Tables were brought out, on which all Kinds of Shop-Commodities were exposed to Sale, each Kind severally in a peculiar Part of this vast Edifice; that every Person, who came to purchase, might know where to meet directly with what he wanted. At some of these Shops and Tables much Time was spent by the Talkative, the Inquisitive, and the Idle.

¹⁶ This was an Instrument, used by the old *Greeks* and *Romans* to clean the Skin; and serving them, besides, for the same Purposes with Our Flesh-Brush. For the ancient politer Nations took a much better Care of their Persons than is customary amongst the Modern *Europeans*. Whenever their Bodys were fouled, as after travelling, or walking in dusty Roads, after Wrestling, or other Exercises, which they used almost naked in Rooms strewed deep with a soft Sand, (to procure them, when they fell, an easy Fall,) they rubbed themselves gently with these Strigils; bathing at the same time in Warm Baths, which were very numerous, and to be met with in all great Towns and Citys. At other times a more vehement Rubbing served in the room of Exercise itself. After using the Strigil, they anointed themselves all over, especially about their Joynts, with some perfumed Oyl or Unguent. Thus the Skin was cleansed, the Blood was equably circulated, the Muscles were strengthened, and the Joynts made supple and pliant.

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Unguent-Box, of your own Worshanship. You farther said, that the Slippers, which you then had on your Feet, were of your own cutting out and making; and that the Garments which you then wore, the Upper and the Under Both, were of your own weaving. But, what seemed the strangest Thing of all, and a Proof of your Ingenuity and Skill the most surprizing, you told us, that the Belt or Girdle, which you wore round your Vest, (and it was of that rare and costly Sort, Such as they make in Persia,) was entirely your own Manufacture. Beside all this, you carried with you thither, on that Occasion, Poems, you said, of your own composing, Epic, Tragic, and Dithyrambic; together with a great Number of your Compositions in Prose upon various Subjects. You assured us, that in the Sciences, those we have just now been speaking of, you was superior to every Person then at the Olympicks; as you also was in the Science of Rhythm and Harmony, and that of Grammar. You enumerated, as well as I remember, a Multitude of other Branches of Knowledge, which you excelled in.
¹⁷ But I think, I had like to have forgotten your Art of Memory,

¹⁷ Our Readers, who will give themselves the Trouble to compare this Passage with Those of the *Io* and of the *Greater Hippias*, explained in Note 31. to the Dialogue last mentioned, will have no Doubt, we imagine, but that the Meaning of *Socrates* in this Place is to intimate, that the Pretensions of *Hippias* to the Knowledge of so many Arts and Sciences were false; that He was the *Man of Falshood* in a *Moral* Sense; and so ignorant in the *Science of Morals*, as not even to know, that there was any such Science. See the next Note, and also Note 14.

Memory, for which you are so famous.¹⁸ Many other Arts I presume you have, which I cannot recollect at present. But what I mean is this ; to put you upon considering those Arts and Sciences, which You are Master of, (and I have mentioned a sufficient Number of them,) and all those beside, which are severally professed by Others ; and then to ask you, if you can think of Any, where the Man of Truth and the Man of Falshood, as We have described them, are Distinct Persons ; and where the Same Man is not equally fitted for speaking Truth and Falshood. Consider the Matter in any Art You please, in any Kind of Wisdom, Skill, or Cunning, or whatever else you chuse to name it, and you will never find it so to be ; since it is not there to be found. For if you know Any, which affords such an Instance, tell me What it is.

HIPP I A S.

¹⁹ I am not able, Socrates, thus on the sudden.

So-

¹⁸ From hence to the End of this Speech All will appear insipid and cold, a tedious Inforcing of a Meaning obvious to apprehend, quite contrary to the Manner of the Ancients, especially of *Plato* ; if it be supposed to have any other Scope, than to ascertain to his Disciples what Science he meant, and to expose to them the Ignorance of *Hippias* concerning the Nature and even the Name of it.

¹⁹ If the Construction, which we have put on the foregoing Speech of *Socrates* be admitted, the Turn of this Answer may be seen by comparing it with an Answer of the same Kind, made by *Hippias* on a very similar Occasion, in the longer Dialogue of His Name, Page 96.— On the Truth of the same Construction will depend the Meaning of

SOCRATES.

Nor ever, as I imagine, will you be able. If I am in the Right then, remember, Hippias, what Conclusion follows from My Reasoning.

HIPPIAS.

It does not readily occur to Me, Socrates, what Conclusion 'tis you mean.

SOCRATES.

You do not perhaps at present exercise your Art of Memory. ²⁰ No Doubt, you think there is at present no Occasion for it. I will assist you therefore in recollecting. Do you not remember that you said, Achilles was a Man of Truth, and Ulysses a Man of Cunning and Falshood?

HIPPIAS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

But now you perceive, that the Man of Truth and the Man of Falshood have proved to be the Same Person. So that, if Ulysses was a Man of Falshood, it appears that he was no less a Man of Truth; and if Achilles was a Man of Truth, we find he must also have been a Man of Falshood. These two

Socrates in his next Reply. For, if We are right, it contains a severe Judgment passed on *Hippias*, that he never would attain to Moral Science, because he knew not that he wanted it.

²⁰ Meaning, as we presume, that *Hippias*, amongst his other Pretensions, not having made Any to the Science of Morals, nor to the Art of Reasoning, had no Occasion for Lying to support such Pretensions. See Note 17.

two Characters then are not heterogeneous, one from the other ; much less are they opposite, as You imagined ; but are similar, and meet in the Same Man.

HIPPIAS.

Socrates, you are always twisting and winding Arguments in this Sort of Way. In every Matter of Debate, you always pick out that Point in which most Difficulty lies ; you stick close to That, and handle it with a most minute Exactness : but you never meddle with the ²¹ Whole of the Subject, considered in One View. For I can produce you now a Multitude of Proofs, if You are disposed to hear them, sufficient to convince you, that Homer has made Achilles a Man of Sincerity, and of greater Virtue than Ulysses ; whom he has made Crafty, False, and Deceitful, in fine, a Worse Man than Achilles. And to oppose My Proofs, do You, if you have a Mind to it, bring Others on Your Side of the Question, to prove Ulysses the Better

²¹ *Hippias* himself is here made to expose his own loose, vague, and declamatory Way of Talking ; so opposite to that close, precise, and truly Logical Manner of *Socrates* in his Discourses, by which alone Truth can be discovered, and the Disputes arising in Conversation be brought to any rational or fair Conclusion. But This not being now or ever the Intention of *Hippias*, he expresses in this Speech his Uneasiness at the present Method of managing the Debate, and his Desire of returning to his usual Long Harangues ; showing himself in this respect also the *ψευδης*, or *Man of Falshood* ; according to the Old Maxim, "*Dolosus versatur in Generalibus*," the Man, who means to deceive, deals only in Generals, and avoids coming to Particulars. Compare this Passage with what *Hippias* says in the longer Dialogue of His Name, Page 109. of our Translation.

Better Man: by which Means our little Audience here may be the better enabled to judge, Which of Us speaks the Best.

SOCRATES.

²² I have no Doubt, Hippias, but that Your Wisdom is superior to Mine. But 'tis a constant Rule with Me, at the Time when any Man is speaking, to give him my Attention; especially, if I think him a Wise Man: and, as I am desirous of comprehending perfectly all he means, afterwards I interrogate, and sift him thorowly concerning all he has said; I consider it over again, and compare it with the Account he gives me in his Answers, in order to my own better Information. But if I think the Speaker insignificant, and not worth regarding, after he has done speaking I ask him no Questions, nor give myself any Trouble about what he has been talking of. You may know by This, what Persons I account Wise. You may also find, that I am studious and solicitous about the Sayings of ²³ Such a Man; that I am busy and restless in putting Questions to him, with a View of being improved by the Acquisition of some Piece of Knowledge. Accordingly, I took

²² *Socrates* here intimates, that the Source of that Habit, which *Hippias* had, of Lying and Deceiving, was a Fondness for unmerited or false Praise, with an Affectation of being thought Wise.

²³ The Word in the Original here is printed τέττε, but we presume ought to be either τέτων, agreeably to the Translations of *Ficinus* and *Grynæus*, or as we have supposed it in Ours, τοιόντε.

took particular Notice, in my own Mind, of ²⁴ Something which seemed to Me very strange in that Passage of Homer, if Your Interpretation of it be true, that which you repeated just now, to prove that Achilles treated Ulysses as a Deceiver. This to Me, I say, seemed strange; because Ulysses, your cunning Ulysses, no where appears to have spoken Untruths: But 'tis Achilles, whom we find cunning, according to Your Account, as being a Teller of Falsitys, and deceiving Others. For having premised that fair Profession, which You just now repeated,

*Not the black Gates of Hades are to Me
More hostil or more hateful, than the Man,
Whose Tongue holds no Communion with his Heart.*

a little afterwards he declares, that he would not be dissuaded from his Purpose, not by Ulysses and Agamemnon together; nor would he be by any Means prevailed on to stay in the Trojan Territorys; but, says he,

²⁵ *To morrow, after Sacrifice to Jove
And All that next in Nature is Divine,*

My

²⁴ From the Sense it is evident, that we ought here to read in the Greek ὅ, τι — ἄτοπον κ. τ. λ. not ὅτι [δι' ἐνός,] an Error frequent throughout the printed Text. Stephens has frequently indeed corrected it; but has passed it over in this and many other Places.

²⁵ We meet with this Passage in the Ninth Book of the *Iliad*, ὅ. 357, &c. a little after the former; and Both of them exactly as they are cited by Plato.

*My well-mann'd Gallys launch I from the Shore
 Into the briny Waves : and thou shalt see,
 (If curious of the Sight, or thy Concern
 Thou make'st it,) with the dawning Hour of Day,
 My Fleet spread o'er the fishy Hellespont ;
 With many an eager Stroke of the brisk Oars
 Short'ning the Passage : And if Neptune grant
 Prosperous Voya'ge, the third returning Light
 Shall view me on rich Pthia's fertil Plains.*

Besides, long before this, with an Air of Insult he had said thus to Agamemnon,

²⁶ *And now with my full Gallys I depart,
 Steering my Course for Pthia : — my best Course
 Is homeward, — here dishonor'd. — Nor shalt Thou
 Meet better Fare, I ween : — no more expect,
 Spoils and rich Plunder shall attend thine Arms.*

Now though he had made this Declaration, first in the Face of the whole Army, and afterwards to Such as were intimate with him, it no where appears, that he made any
 Pre-

²⁶ The Verses, here cited, occur in the First Book of the *Iliad*, with a Difference only in One Word. For instead of *λάϊον*, which we read in *Plato*, we find in *Homer* *φέρερον* : a Difference not taken Notice of by *Barnes* in his *Var. Lect.* Perhaps he thought it not of Importance enough to mention. But, in Editions of the finest Writers of Antiquity, too minute an Accuracy, we think, never can be used.

Preparations for his Voyage, or any Attempts toward the launching of his Ships, in order to his Departure homeward ; but, on the contrary, with a noble Indifference he disregarded the keeping of his Word, and the speaking Truth. It was for this Reason, Hippias, that I proposed my first Question to you ; because I was at a Loss to know, Which of those two Heroes the Poet had made the Better Man : but I presumed that Both were excellent ; and that 'twas difficult to determine Whether was the Superior, as well with respect to speaking Truth and ²⁷ Falshood, as every other Kind of Virtue. For in that Point, no less than in Others, they seemed nearly on a Par.

HIPPIAS.

You view not the Matter in its true Light, Socrates. For, though Achilles breaks his Word, 'tis plain that he had no Intention to deceive, nor any dissembled Meaning : but, against his Inclination, he is obliged, by the Distresses of the Army, to stay and give them his Assistance. But when Ulysses speaks falsely, 'tis with Design, and his Falshood is Voluntary.

SOCRATES.

My dear Friend Hippias, you deceive Me ; and are guilty, your Self, of doing as you say Ulysses did.

H P-

²⁷ Socrates here mentions *Falshood* as well as *Truth*, in order to preserve Consistence in his Argumentation ; having proved to *Hippias*, that the speaking Falshood well was the Effect of *some Kind* of Knowledge and Virtue.

G

HIPPIAS.

Far from it, Socrates. How mean you? and in what respect?

SOCRATES.

By telling me, that Achilles had no Intention to deceive, nor any dissembled Meaning: whereas Achilles, in saying through Arrogance what he had no serious Intention of doing, was so²⁸ artful an Impostor, as Homer has represented him, that he appears confident of out-witting Ulysses, and concealing from Him the Emptiness of his Arrogance; nay, to that Degree confident, as to dare in His Presence to

²⁸ In the Greek, *Γόης*, or *cunning Jugler*. By *Achilles* here, we suppose, is meant that very Passion of *Arrogance* in him, which is the most distinguished Part of his Character. For all the great Actions and Events of *Homer's Iliad* turn upon the Desire of *Achilles* to show to the *Grecians* the Importance of his Presence and his Aid. By the same Name, *Γόης*, is the Passion of *Love* called in *Plato's Banquet*, and in the same Metaphorical Sense; because Both these Passions impose upon a Man's own Understanding, and force him to say and do Things, to which his Reason is by no means privy; putting him, as in this Case of *Achilles*, upon contradictory Promises and Assertions; and, by their bold Assurance, making him believe them all, by turns, Himself.—We cannot help thinking, that *Plato* here intended to carry on the Allegory; and by *Ulysses* would signify *Prudence*, out-witted as it were and silenced by Passion. For 'tis certain, that the Ancients put a *Moral Interpretation* on Both the Poems of *Homer*; and took all his *Characters* not only for *Historical* or *real* Persons, but for *Allegorical* also, representing so many Virtues, Vices, or Passions, either mixed or simple. *Tasse* and *Ariosto*, profess to have written their Epic Poems with the same Intention: and 'tis obvious enough to All, indeed too obvious, in our own *Spencer*. All of them herein imitating, doubtless, the Father and Prince of Epic Poetry.

to contradict Himself. Accordingly we find Ulysses actually imposed upon. For, as we see from his Silence on that Head, he discovered not, that Achilles had told him any Untruth.

HIPPAS.

Where is all this to be found, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Do you not remember, that ²⁹ after he had declared, (as he did to Ulysses,) that he would set Sail early the next Day; to Ajax on the other hand he says no such Thing, but tells him a quite different Story.

HIPPAS.

In what Passage?

SOCRATES.

In this,

*³⁰ No more in bloody Field shall I engage,
I nor my Forces; till great Priam's Son,*

The

²⁹ In the Greek this Passage is read thus; Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λέγων, ὑστέρων ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεῦ εἶπε ἅμα τῇ ἡοὶ ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. Stephens saw, that this was a corrupt Reading; but an Emendation of it not readily occurring to his Mind, he supposed that many Words were wanting. A slight Alteration only will, as we imagine, correct the Sentence thus; Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λέγων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ (ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεῦ εἶπε) ἅμα τῇ ἡοὶ ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. agreeable to which we have made our Translation.

³⁰ Achilles speaks of Hector thus highly on this Occasion, purposely to raise the higher, in Those who heard him, the Idea of his own Valour; None but himself, he tells them, being able to stop the Progress

*The godlike Hector, worthy of his Sire,
Thro' Heaps of slaughter'd Greeks, victorious reach
My Myrmidons ; or till his hostile Flames,
Spreading from Ship to Ship, approach my own.
Then,—near My Vessel, or My Tent, I trust,
Shall Hector's Fury, though impetuous, meet
A Bound impassable. —*

Now can You imagine, Hippias, that He was so forgetful, this Son of the Goddess Thetis, this Pupil of the Sage Chiron, as that, after throwing out the bitterest Reproaches upon Such as speak what they mean not, he should first tell Ulysses that he would sail away, and then, thro' Forgetfulness, assure Ajax that he would continue where he was? Do you not think, that he must have talked in this manner with Design, and from a Supposal that Ulysses was a plain simple Man, and that He should get the better of him that very way, by Artifice and Lying.

HIP-

of so mighty and formidable an Enemy. Mr. Pope therefore, in omitting those high Terms in which *Hector* here mentions *Achilles*, has omitted an Essential Beauty in this Passage, and particularly material to that Purpose, for which it is cited by *Socrates*,—to shew, that the inconsistent Falsties, uttered by *Achilles*, were owing to his *Arrogance* and his *Thirst of Glory*. See the *Argument* of this Dialogue, page 6. The Verses are taken from the Ninth Book of the *Iliad*, v. 646, &c. But there is evidently a false Reading in them, as cited by *Plato*, μεθήσομαι instead of μεθήσομαι, observed by *Barnes*, in his Notes on *Homer*.

HIPPIAS.

I think quite otherwise, Socrates : I think, that He was imposed upon, Himself, by his own Simplicity and undesigning Heart : and that Want of Reflection made him talk to Ajax in a Strain different from that in which he had been talking to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks Truth, has always an Intention to deceive, no less than when he speaks a Falshood.

SOCRATES.

Ulysses then is a Better Man, it seems, than Achilles.

HIPPIAS.

By no means, Socrates, clearly.

SOCRATES.

Why, was it not proved just now, that the Speakers of Falshoods, knowing them so to be, and with Intention to deceive, were ³¹ Better Men than Those, who spoke what was false meerly through Ignorance, and against their Intention ?

HIP-

³¹ See Page 24, &c. This is another Instance, similar to That, taken Notice of by *Aristotle*, which we mentioned in Note 11. of a Sophistical way of arguing, used by *Plato* against the Sophists. (See Note 4. to the Synopsis.) For the Truth of the Position, contended for, has indeed been proved ; and is apparent enough, in every inferior Art or Science ; but *Plato* applies it in this Place to Morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct Contrary insinuated. See Note 13. There is the same Ambiguity of Expression in our own Language ; for we use the Term, *Good Man*, with reference not only to *Moral Goodness*, but even *Ability* or *Skill* in any Way whatever. Such a one, we say, is a *Good Man*, when we only mean, as to some particular Kind of Work or Action which he *performs well*.

HIPPIAS.

But how is it possible, Socrates, that Such as are guilty of Injustice knowingly, Such as are deceitful, and insidious, and wilfully do Mischief, should be Better Men than Those, who, not knowing what they do, lead Others into Mischiefs or Mistakes? To Such is due free Pardon, should any Injustice be done by Their Means, or if any Man be deceived by them, or suffer Injury. ³² The Laws accordingly are more severe to designing Cheats, and to the wilfully Injurious, than to Such as deceive or injure without Intention of so doing.

SOCRATES.

You see, Hippias, that I spoke Truth, when I told you, how busy and restless I was in putting Questions to the Wise. ³³ I fear indeed, that I have no other valuable Quality belonging to me; the rest which I have being inconsiderable and mean. For I am apt to be mistaken in the Natures of Things,

³² *Demosthenes* in *Orat. c. Midiam*, §. 11. pag. 35, and 36. of Dr. Taylor's Edition in 8^{vo}. gives an Account of these Laws somewhat more at large, too long to be here inserted, but so like this of *Plato's*, and so much in the same Words, that it seems highly probable, he had an Eye towards it, when he composed that Part of his Oration. For that incomparable Orator was always a great Admirer of *Plato*, and had been one of his favorite Disciples; as we are told by the Writer of the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, vulgarly ascribed to *Plutarch*.

³³ *This* and such other Sayings, frequent in the Mouth of *Socrates*, passed with the People even of his own Time for meer Ironys. Whence he was commonly called *ὁ εἰρων*, the *Dissembler of his Knowledge*, or Pretender to Ignorance. But for an Explication of *This* Saying at least, somewhat different from the vulgar one, see below, Note 36.

Things, and ignorant of what they truly are. A sufficient Evidence of which appears, whenever I am in Company with any of You celebrated Wise Men, whose Wisdom is acknowledged by the united Voices of all the Grecians. It then appears that I know Nothing: For scarcely in any Point am I of the same Opinion with You. And what greater Evidence can there be of a Man's Want of Knowledge, than his differing in Opinion from the Wise. I have this one admirable Quality, however, which saves me from³⁴ the fatal Consequences of Ignorance and Error; This, that I am not ashamed to learn;³⁵ but am given to Inquiry, and to asking Questions. I am very thankful also to the Person who vouchsafes me an Answer: nor ever neglected I to pay him my due Acknowledgments. For whenever I had acquired a Piece of Knowledge, I never denied my having learnt it; nor ever pretended, that 'twas of my own Finding out. On the contrary, I celebrate the Wisdom of my³⁶ Teacher, whenever I produce the Doctrine, which
He

³⁴ See Note 107. to the *Greater Hippias*.

³⁵ See Note 103. to the same Dialogue.

³⁶ This, and what follows, *Socrates* speaks in his *lower* Character, that Compound of Sensations, Fancies, Opinions, and Passions, which every One of us is apt to call Himself. See Note 70. to the *Greater Hippias*. Viewing himself in this Light, he confesses always, that his own Ignorance, and Aptitude to err, were equal to those of Other Men; and sets up the Universal *Divine Teacher* and Instructor, as The only *Wise* and Knowing in the *Truth*. This is the Person, whom he here says that he was accustomed to consult, and to inquire of; the
Person,

He taught me. Thus at present, for Instance, I agree not with You in that Position, which you have laid down for Truth ; but am strongly of a different Opinion. And This, I am convinced, arises from Something in Me, and must be attributed to my being ³⁷ Such a one as I am ; to avoid using any Term or Epithet too high, in speaking of my Self. To Me, Hippias, the Truth appears directly Contrary to what You say. I think, that Those, who injure Others, who are guilty of Injustice, who vent Falshoods, and deceive, or commit any other Fault, ³⁸ knowingly and wilfully, are better Men than Such as do the same Evils
igno-

Person, from whom he received with Thankfulness satisfactory Answers to his Questions ; and whose Wisdom he never failed to celebrate, whenever his own Discourse gave Occasion to the Discovery of any Truth. For he not only here insinuates, but in many other of *Plato's* Dialogues he maintains, and in the *Meno* and *Theætetus* proves, that no Part of Science can be either found out or taught by *Man* ; but lyes as it were latent in every *Mind*, till excited and brought to Light by fair, diligent, and deep Inquiry.

³⁷ Here *Socrates* assumes his *higher* Character. For he means the Great ΔΑΙΜΩΝ, or *Divinity within him* ; intimating at the same time to his Disciples, that this *Divinity* is, in the properest and truest Sense, *Himself*. See *Characteristicks*, vol. 2. p. 355, 358. *Letters on Mind*, p. 33, and 69. We the rather refer to these two Books, because the Writers of them appear thorowly to have penetrated, as to this Point in particular, the Sense of *Plato*.

³⁸ *Socrates* says This on the Vulgar Hypothesis, that Bad Men have the *Knowledge of Good and Evil*, and consequently *Free Will* : which Hypothesis he labours to overturn, by showing what an absurd Consequence follows from it. See Note 13. and the *Argument* of this Dialogue, towards the End.

ignorantly and without free Choice. ³⁹ Sometimes, however, I am in the Opposite Way of Thinking. In short my Sentiments are ever varying upon this Subject, and driven backward and forward continually: the Cause of which Unsteadiness is clearly Want of Knowledge. But I now find in my self a fresh Accession of my old Malady. For the Opinion, which prevails in me at present, is This;—that Such as commit Wilful Errors in any Action whatever, are Better Men, with respect to Actions in that Way, than Those who err in the same Way against their Will or Intention. This present Turn of Mind in me is owing, as I imagine, to the preceding Part of Our Conversation. For our Reasoning upon the Point, then debated, will, in all Appearance at present, ⁴⁰ hold good through all things; and will prove, that the Involuntary Actors of Ill, in any of those Instances We have mentioned, are more Wicked than Those, who are guilty of the same bad Actions wilfully. Be so good therefore, as to set my Mind right: for in healing the Disease of This, and freeing it from Ignorance,

³⁹ That is, at those Times when he was not *reasoning*, but *acting*. For, whenever a Man acts, supposing him under no *outward Constraint*, and governed only by *internal Motives*, whatever those Motives are, let him be ever so much under the Power of Passion, he must *seem to himself* as if he willed and acted *freely*; because his Mind, that is, *He himself*, *assents* to those Motives, Ends, or Moving Causes of his Action: without which *Assent* of the Mind he could not act. See Note 6.

⁴⁰ *Plato's* own Words in this Passage prove the Truth of that Observation of *Aristotle's*, mentioned towards the End of Note 13.

H

norance, you will do me a much greater Piece of Service, than you would in healing any Distemper incident to my Body. But now, should You have any Intention to go thro' a long Harangue, I can assure you beforehand, that you will never That Way succeed in the Affair: for My Thoughts never will be able to keep Even Pace with you. But if you are disposed to answer to My Questions, as you did before, you will highly ⁴¹ profit and improve Me; and, I presume, receive no Detriment, your Self. I have a Right, Eudicus, to beg Your Interest with Hippias on this Occasion; for You it was, who engaged me in this Dispute with him. If He therefore is averse to continuing the Conversation in the Way which I desire, do You intercede with him to favour my Request.

EUDICUS.

There will be no Occasion, Socrates, I imagine, for My Intercession. That is made unnecessary by what Hippias himself said at first, — that he never declined answering to any Man's Questions. Did you not say so, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

I own it, Eudicus. But Socrates is always intangling the Argument with cunning Fallacys; and behaves like a fly Deceiver.

SOCRATES.

My good Hippias! I do it not wilfully, I assure you, nor with any Intention to deceive. For, if that were the Case

⁴¹ See the last Sentence but one in the *Greater Hippias*.

Case, I should be a Man of great Wisdom and Abilitys, according to Your Account. But, if I have that Fault which You accuse me of, 'tis wholly involuntary in Me. I pray you therefore, pardon me : For Pardon, you say, is due to involuntary and ignorant Deceivers.

EUDICUS.

Do so, Hippias ; forgive Socrates ; and be not angry with him : but for My Sake, and out of Regard to your own Word, answer to whatever Questions He shall propose to you.

HIPPIAS.

Well, at Your Intreaty, I will answer to his Questions. — Come then ; propose Any, which you desire to have an Answer to.

SOCRATES.

Truly, Hippias, I am greatly desirous to have a thorow Discussion of that very Point, just now mentioned ; — Which are the Better Sort of Men ; Those who commit Errors knowingly, wilfully, and purposely ; or those Others, who are guilty of the very Same without knowing what they do, and without any Will or Purpose to err. ⁴² Now the best Way

⁴² Every *Universal Truth* will hold good in *all Particular Cases*, to which it is applicable. In the Way of Reasoning therefore by Induction, the Enumerating of *many Particulars*, however chosen, in which the Hypothesis to be proved is found true, serves to induce a *Probability* at least of its being true *universally*. And if the Hypothesis *fails in no Instance* that can be thought of, the *Certainty* of it is then sufficiently

Way we can take, to have this Point well examined, is, in My Opinion, by setting out thus; — but observe, and make your Answers duly: — ⁴³ Are there not Men, who are Good at a Foot-Race?

HIPPIAS.

There are.

Sq-

established. — It should seem therefore, that *Plato* might have been indifferent, What Instances he produced to prove a Doctrine, which, if true, might fairly be inferred from a Multitude of Any, pitched upon at random. And indeed, had This been All he had in View, indifferent he would certainly have been, to Which he gave the Preference. But his Design, in selecting from all the several Kinds of Action the particular Instances that follow, to the End of this Second Part of the Dialogue, is to show, What *Weaknesses* or *Disorders* in the Human Frame are the *natural Causes* of *Ignorance* and *Vice*; and What *natural Disposition* of Body and Mind is *favorable to Knowledge* and *Virtue*. In the Choice and Arrangement of these Instances will appear admirable Art and Contrivance: for the Discovery of which he prepares us in This Sentence, by professing to take a certain *Method*, and *Way of Beginning*, Such as is the most proper.

⁴³ *Plato* begins, and takes his Four First Instances from such Actions, as fundamentally depend on the Structure of the Body, and the Conformation of its Parts; in particular, *Running*, *Wrestling*, *Dancing*, and *Singing*. For the well-performing of these Exercises, so far as the Body is concerned, severally depends on *Agility*, *Strength*, *Gracefulness*, and a *Musical Voice*: and these severally arise from Elasticity of the Fibres, Firmness in the Fabrick of the Bones, Pliantness in the Joynts, and a perfect Power of Dilatation and Contraction in the Lungs and Larynx. When all These concur, the natural Consequences will be an animated, free, and easy Flow of the Blood and Humours, Spriteliness and Vigour in the Soul, and at the same time (if no Obstacle hinder,) Firmness in the Mind.

SOCRATES.

And Others in the same Exercise who are Bad ?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Are not the Good, Those who run well ? and the Bad, Those who run ill ?

HIPPIAS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

Do not the Slow Runners run ill ? the Swift Runners, well ?

HIPPIAS.

They do.

SOCRATES.

In the Race therefore, and in Running, Swiftneſs is a Good Thing ; Slowneſs, a Bad Thing.

HIPPIAS.

Without Dispute.

SOCRATES.

Whether of theſe Two then is the Better Man in the Race ? One, who runs ſlow wilfully and on Purpoſe ; or One, whoſe Slowneſs in running is involuntary and undeſigned ?

HIPPIAS.

The Firſt ; he, who runs ſlow on Purpoſe.

SOCRATES.

Is not Running the Doing ſomething.

HIP-

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And if so, is not some Action performed in **Running?**

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

The Man therefore, who runs ill, performs an Action,
which is Bad and Unseemly in the Race.

HIPPIAS.

Undoubtedly so.

SOCRATES.

And the Man runs ill, you say, who runs slowly.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

He therefore is the Good Man in the Race, who wil-
fully and purposely commits this Bad and Unseemly Ac-
tion : and He is the Bad Man, who does it against his Will
and his Intention.

HIPPIAS.

So it seems to be.

SOCRATES.

In the Race therefore, the Man, who is guilty of Bad
Actions against his Will and his Intention, is a Worse Man
than the Other, in whom those Bad Actions are voluntary
and intended.

HIP-

HIPPIAS.

In the Race, I grant you, that 'tis so.

SOCRATES.

And how is it in Wrestling? Whether of the Two is the Better Wrestler? the Man who, when he falls, falls designedly, or the Man whose Falls are involuntary and undesigned?

HIPPIAS.

Probably, the Man who falls designedly.

SOCRATES.

And which is the Worse and more Unseemly Action in Wrestling? for a Man to fall, Himself, or to give his Antagonist a Fall?

HIPPIAS.

To fall, Himself.

SOCRATES.

In Wrestling then also, the Man, who is guilty of Bad and Unseemly Actions with Design, is a Better Man than the Other, who is guilty of the Same without designing them.

HIPPIAS.

'Tis probable, that he is.

SOCRATES.

And how does the Rule hold with respect to all other Actions of the Body? Is not the Man, whose Body is well-framed and fitly disposed, equally Able for Actions either Strong or Weak, either Seemly and Becoming, or Unbecoming

becoming and Aukward? So that the Man, who has a Better Habit of Body, when he performs any Bodily Exercise or Action ill, does it out of Choice; but the Man, whose Body is in a Worse State, performs ill against his Inclination.

HIPPIAS.

In Actions which depend on Strength of Body, I admit the Truth of your Hypothesis.

SOCRATES.

And what say you as to those, which depend on Gracefulness of the Body, Hippias? Does it not belong to that Body, which is well formed and well habituated, to exhibit unseemly and bad Motions, Gestures, and Attitudes, only when the Mind so wills and directs; but to a Body of Worse Make and Worse Habits, to behave, move, and carry itself aukwardly without such Will and Direction? or How think you?

HIPPIAS.

That 'tis, as You say.

SOCRATES.

Ungracefulness therefore also, when voluntary, belongs to the Body in its Better Plight; when involuntary, is owing to an Ill or Depraved State of Body.

HIPPIAS.

So indeed it appears.

So-

I

SOCRATES.

And how think you as to the Voice? Which Voice do you suppose the Better and more Excellent? That, which sings out of Tune wilfully and designedly; or That, which does so because it cannot do otherwise?

HIPPIAS.

That, which does so designedly.

SOCRATES.

And That you call a Viler Voice, which errs from the Harmony, and cannot help it.

HIPPIAS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Farther; — ⁴⁴ the Things which are Yours, whether would you chuse to have them in Good Condition and Order, or to have them Bad, Depraved, and out of Order?

HIP-

⁴⁴ His Five next Instances he takes from those Parts of the Body, which are the more immediate Servants of the Mind: 1. The *Outward Instruments of Motion*, (particularising in the Feet,) by which the *Will of the Mind is executed*: 2. The *Outward Organs of Sensation*, (enumerating them all,) through which the *Mind perceives Outward Things*: 3. That *immediate Source of Motion and Sensation*, the *Brain*; to signify which, he uses the Metaphor of a *Rudder, steering the Body* as the Mind pleases: 4. Those *inward Instruments of Motion*, and *Vehicles of Sensation*, the *Nerves*; which he compares to the *Strings of Musical Instruments*, *braced up or relaxed* by the different *Passions* of the Soul, and *vibrating* just as they are *touched from without*, or *play'd on* by the *Musician's Hand within*: 5. and lastly, The *Organs of Speech*, signified by *Wind-Instruments* of Musick, through which the *Mind expresses her Meaning*,

HIPPIAS.

To have them Good, and Such as they ought to be. A

SOCRATES.

Whether then would you chuse, to have your Feet go lame at your own Pleasure, or to have them limp and stumble against your Will.

HIPPIAS.

To go lame at my own Pleasure.

SOCRATES.

Is not Lameness in the Feet a Depravity of the Feet; and the going lame an ungraceful way of Walking?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And is not Squinting a Depravity of the Eyes?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Which Sort of Eyes now would you chuse to have, and to see with? Such as would look askint only when You pleased, or Such as could not avoid Squinting?

HIPPIAS.

Such as squinted only when I pleased.

So-

ing, or declares her Will. How much the Acquisition of Knowledge, the State of the Soul, and Power of the Mind to do what she wills, depend on having all these Organs in Perfection, is by no means difficult to conceive.

SOCRATES.

Of the Things then which are your own, you deem Those, whose wrong and depraved Actions are voluntary, Better than Those, the Pravity of whose Actions is involuntary.

HIPPIAS.

In Things of that Kind, I admit it to be True.

SOCRATES.

All Such therefore, Ears, and Nose, and Mouth, and all other Parts administering to Sensation, are to be comprehended in the following General Rule;—Those, in which the bad Performance of their Functions is Involuntary, a Man would be glad not to have; seeing that Such are Evil; but Those, whose wrong Action or Operation is wilful, and according to the Intention, are desirable; Such being Good.

HIPPIAS.

I agree.

SOCRATES.

Well; and what Sort of Instruments is it Best to have to do with? Those, with which a Man may execute his Work ill thro' Choice and Design; or Those, with which he cannot work otherwise than ill? For Instance; Whether of the Two is the best Rudder? That, with which the Steering ill is unavoidable; or That, with which the Pilot, if he steers ill, does it wilfully and on Purpose?

HIPPIAS.

The Latter Sort.

SOCRATES.

Is it not so with the Bow and Lyre ; so with the Flute ;
⁴⁵ so with every other Kind of Tools and Instruments?

HIPPIAS.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

Well ; ⁴⁶ and of which Horse is it best to be the
 Owner ? whether of a Horse with such a Kind of Temper
 and

⁴⁵ To the Instances already given, which are of more especial Moment, the other *Parts and Members of the Body* are subjoined, in general ; the *regular Frame and sound Condition of them All* being, in the Opinion of *Plato*, of some Importance to the *Soul*, to its *Affections and Passions* ; more or less, in Proportion to the more immediate or more remote *Action, or Influence*, of the One upon the Other. This will open much of *Plato's* secret Meaning in the latter Part of his *Timæus*.

⁴⁶ From the just Frame of the Body, and the right Formation of every Member of it, the Philosopher proceeds, in the same Metaphorical Manner, to describe the other Part of that *εὐφροσύνη*, or *Good natural Disposition*, which he holds to be the necessary *Foundation of Virtue*. This other Part is the *Right Frame or Constitution of the Soul* herself. He begins with the *Passions* ; agreeably to that Climax, which he uses thro' all these Instances. The *Passions* are, in the *Platonic System*, all comprehended under Two Kinds, *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμὸς*, the *Emotions of Desire and Aversion*. The *First* of these Kinds is characterised under the Emblem of a *Horse*, the *Latter* under that of a *Dog* ; and Both with great Propriety. For One of these Animals is remarkably subject to vehement Emotions of the former Kind in Pursuit of Glory or of Pleasure ; the Other to Emotions of the latter Kind no less violent, when the Seizing of his Prey or the Destruction of an Enemy is the End in View. Now Both these Animals, tho' Irrational, are by Nature formed to be *manageable by Man* ; and are highly *serviceable* to him, when their *Passions* are directed to their *proper Objects*, and restrained within due Bounds.

and Spirit, as may serve his Rider in riding ill purposely and through Choice only; or of a Horse, ⁴⁷ upon which his Rider must of Necessity ride ill?

HIPPIAS.

Of the Horse, upon which a Man may ride ill only through Choice.

SOCRATES.

This Horse then is of a better Spirit and Temper than the Other.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

⁴⁸ With this better-tempered Horse then a Man may, if he has an evil Intention, perform such mischievous and evil Tricks, as this Animal is capable of; but with the bad-tempered Horse he cannot avoid doing Mischief.

HIP-

⁴⁷ The Emendation of this Sentence must be attributed to Cornarius: for He has been beforehand with us, in reading ἀμείνον, ἢ ἢ ἀκων, instead of ἀμείνων ἢ ἀκων, as in all the Editions of the Greek 'tis printed.

⁴⁸ Thus in the Greek; Τῇ ἀμείνονι ἀρα ψυχῇ ἵππευ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρεῖα ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ ἐκυσίως ἀν ποιοῖ, τὰ δὲ τῆς πονηρίας, ἀκυσίως. 'Tis evident, that this Reading is faulty. We have always imagined, that the Fault lay in the Transposition of some of the Words, with the Corruption of only One in Consequence of that Transposition; and that the right Reading was this; Τ. α. α. ψ. ι. τ. τ. ψ. ε. τ. τὰ τῆς πονηρίας, ἐκυσίως ἀν ποιοῖ, τῇ δὲ πονηρᾷ, ἀκυσίως. But Cornarius is of Opinion, that the Sentence may be amended by altering only τὰ δὲ τῆς πονηρίας into τῇ δὲ τ. π. which he is pleased to say, signifies the same with τῇ δὲ πονηροτέρᾳ.

HIPPIAS.

Perfectly true.

SOCRATES.

And is it not equally true with respect to the Spirit and Temper of a Dog? and ⁴⁹ so of every other Species of Animals?

HIPPIAS.

I admit it to hold true in the Case of every Brute Animal.

SOCRATES.

Well now; and how is it in our own Species, and with ⁵⁰ respect

⁴⁹ All the *Passions* and *Affections* are here included *Generally*. For Emblematical Writers have often represented Each of these under the Emblem of some *Brute Animal*, in which it is found the *strongest*.

⁵⁰ After the *Passions* and *Affections*, such as are common to all Animals whether Rational or Irrational, being the *Same in Kind*, and differing only in their Objects; next in Order follow those *Facultys of the Soul*, by which Man becomes *superior* to other Animals, and acquires Skill in *Arts* and *Sciences*. Plato here distinguishes the *Arts*, according to *Three different Degrees of Excellence*. In the *lowest Rank* he places Those, which depend chiefly on *Facility of Action or Operation*, gained by *Practical Habits*: in the *middle Rank*, Those which depend chiefly on the *Knowledge of Natural Things*, acquired by *Experience*: and in the *Highest*, Those whose *Principles* are founded on *Science*, the *Knowledge of Things Eternal*, arising from inward *Exercise of the Mind*. Instances in these Three Kinds of Art are taken, in the First Kind, from the *Art of shooting Arrows with a Bow*; in the Second, from the *Art of Medicine*; in the Third, from the *Art of Musick*. To this Triple Order of the Arts answer *Three several Degrees of Capacity* in Man; or rather, *Three Kinds of Natural Powers or Facultys* in the Human Soul, rising one above another in *Degree of Excellence*,

~~speck~~ to the Human Soul? Whether is it Better to have in our Service a Bowman, who, if he ever misses the Mark, misses

cellence, as they approach nearer to That, which is *Highest* in the Soul, the *Leading Power* itself. The *lowest*, because nearest of Kin to meer Vivacity and Spriteliness, (which are Corporeal) are *Docility*, *Ingenuity*, and *Quickness of Mind*; the only Requisites for the Attainment of Skill in *Arts meerly Practical*. Superior to these, because nearly allied to Strength of Mind and Judgment, are *Memory*, *Penetration*, and *Sagacity*; such being the Powers requisite, *over and above* those of a lower Class, for the acquiring Skill in Those Arts, in which there is much Room for *judicious Opinion* and *probable Conjecture*; because their Subjects admit but *little of Certainty*; and the Ablest Professors of them are They, whose *Opinion* of the *Present* is the most *Judicious*, and whose *Conjecture* of the *Future* is the most *Sagacious*, and founded on the most *Knowledge* of what is *Past*. The Natural Powers or Facultys in Man, of a Class still *higher*, making the Soul, in which they are *strong*, as it were a rich Soil, fit for raising up the *Finest Arts*, are a just *Sense*, *Taste*, or *Feeling*, of *Harmony* and *Beauty* and every Thing of *that Kind*; a nice *Discernment* of whatever is *opposite* to these; and a *Power of comprehending many Beautys, Harmonys, or Truths in One*.—To want Any of these Three Degrees of Capacity, or Kinds of Natural Power, is to be so far defective in that *εὐψυχία*, that excellent *Disposition* formed by *Nature*, on which *Knowledge* and *Virtue* are built by *Discipline* and *Habit*; and to be so far exposed, through *involuntary Failures*, to Ignorance and Vice.—But *Plato* has a farther, a Metaphorical, Meaning in this Place. His View in selecting the three Arts of Shooting at a Mark, of Medicine, and of Musick, from amongst many Others of their respective Classes, is, by these apt Metaphors, the Same which in many other of his Dialogues he employs for the same Purpose, to denote the State of a Soul, darkened through Ignorance, and disordered with Vice. For, in the first place, *the Mind*, whose Nature is to have always *Truth* and *Good* in *View*, and to *aim* at them in all the

misses wilfully ⁵¹; or one who is apt so to do, contrary to his Intention and his Aim?

HIPPIAS.

One who misses wilfully.

SOCRATES.

Such a one then is a Better Man at Shooting.

HIPPIAS.

Right.

So-

the *Energys* and *Actions* which she *directs*, her Eye being in Such a Case obscured or distorted, *mistakes* her Aim, by taking *Falshood* for *Truth* and *Evil* for *Good*; or else *misses it*, by fancying *Truth* and *Good* to be where they are not, and thus *erring* from her *right Mark*. In the next place, *Reason* and *Passion* being at Variance; and *One Passion* combating with *Another*, where All ought to *sympathise*, *conspire*, and *co-operate*; the *Health* of the Soul, the *well-tempered Commixture* of the Ingredients in her *Composition*, and the *Integrity* of her *Functions*, are destroyed. In the last place, the *Inward Harmony* being at length quite spoilt, the *Actions* of the Man are *dissonant* One from Another, the *Tenor* of his Conduct becomes *unmusical*, and all the *Numbers* and *Measures* of his Life are throughout *discomposed* and *broken*.

⁵¹ In the Editions of the *Greek Text*, the Sentence stands thus; Τὶ δὲ δὴ; ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν κεκλῆσθαι τοξότου ἀμείνονος ἐστίν, ἥτις ἐκασίως ἀμαρτάνει τῷ σκοπῷ, ἢ ἥτις ἀκυσίως; But we should be glad to read it, as follows; Τὶ δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπου; ψυχὴν κεκλῆσθαι τοξότου ἀμεινον ἐστίν, κ. τ. λ. transferring the first Point of Interrogation to the Word ἀνθρώπου, and altering the Word ἀμείνονος into ἀμεινον, which latter Emendation was made before us by *Cornarius*. Both together will render this Sentence much more agreeable to the Turn of those which precede, than the Alteration of it proposed by *Stephens*.

SOCRATES.

In our own Species therefore, and with respect to the
⁵² Human Soul, the Man, who misses Aim or errs without
 intending so to do, is a Worse Man than the Other, whose
 missing of the Mark is undesigned, or whose Error is In-
 voluntary.

HIPPIAS.

In the Bowman's Art I grant you that 'tis so.

SOCRATES.

And how is it in the Art of Medicine? Is not He the
 Better Physician, who, if he hurts or brings any Disorder
 on the Bodily Frame, does it knowingly and purposely?

HIPPIAS.

He is.

SOCRATES.

In this Art also then, Such a one is a Better Man than
 One who hurts when he would heal.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And how is it in Musick, whether of the String or of
 the Wind-Kind? how, in all other Arts and Sciences? Is
 not

⁵² The Original, as printed, runs thus; Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀκυσίως ἀμαρ-
 τάνουσα, κ. τ. λ. But the Reasoning requires the Word ἀνθρώπου to be
 inserted after the Word ἄρα. It was easily dropped, in transcribing some
 Manuscript, on account of the Similitude of the Letters which follow
 it: the ancient Manner of writing it being This; Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀνὲ ἀκυσί-
 σίως, κ. τ. λ. See the latter Part of Note 48. to the Greater Hippias.

not He the Better Man, who purposely performs ill, and commits Voluntary Errors? and is not He the Bad Man, who blunders and errs, without designing it?

HIPPIAS.

Probably so.

SOCRATES.

⁵³ And we certainly should chuse to have under our Command such Slaves, as committed Voluntary Faults, and were guilty of Bad Actions purposely, rather than Such as could not help blundering, doing wrong, and acting perversely; the former Sort being Better for our Service.

HIPPIAS.

In That also we agree.

So-

⁵³ Plato, having enumerated many Actions, Energys, and Works, where all faulty Miscarriage is involuntary; but in the Choice of which Instances

Much more is meant than meets the Eye;

closes with One more, in which he ascends to the *Highest Power in the Soul*, commonly called *Will*, and by the *Stoicks* termed *προαίρεσις*. This, when from Nature it is Such as it ought to be, *crowns and completes* the *εὐνοία*, or *Excellence of Natural Disposition*. And Such as it ought to be, from Nature it is, when the *Passions and Affections*, with every other *Power and Faculty of the Soul*, being supposed in full *Strength and Vigour*, the *Governing Principle* has still Power sufficient to maintain her *Sovereignty over All*, and is her Self free from any *Government but her own*. Farther, by this Metaphor of a *Slave*, absolutely in the *Power of his Master*, and endued with fit *Abilitys* for the Discharge of those *Offices* to which he is *appointed*, the Philosopher represents to us the State of the Soul, where *Reason governs*, where the *Whole Man* is in *right Order*, and where the *Will* is truly *Free*.

SOCRATES.

Well then ; do we not wish to be as Good and Excellent as possible, our Selves?

HIPPIAS.

To be sure.

SOCRATES.

Would not our own Mind, Spirit, and Temper be Better, if we did Evil and committed Faults wilfully and freely, than if we could not avoid those Faults, and evil Actions?

HIPPIAS.

It would be a strange Thing, Socrates, if the wilfully Unjust and Dishonest were Better Men than Those, who unwittingly or unwillingly did a base Action.

SOCRATES.

⁵⁴ And yet This appears to be the just Conclusion from those Premises, in which we are agreed.

HIP-

[⁵⁴ That is, upon the absurd Supposition, that there are any such Men. See the *Argument*, page 9. But if still the Question should be asked, Whence is it, that a Man may *err wilfully* in executing any *Work or Energy of Art*, or in performing any *Action meerly Natural*, (for so is it with great Truth supposed throughout the Dialogue,) and that *Power and Will* may in all Such Cases be *separated*; yet that 'tis otherwise with respect to *Moral Actions*; that *no Error* here is truly *Voluntary*, and *no Bad Man* is *Free*? The Reason is this; that in all other Cases the Workman, or Performer, may aim at some *other End* than the *Excellence of his Work*, or the *Rectitude of his Performance*: but that in every Action, where *Morality* is concerned, that is, in every Action *morally Good or Evil*, the *Attainment* of what a Man *thinks his Good* is

HIPPIAS.

It appears not so to Me.

SOCRATES.

To You your Self, I imagined, it must so appear. Let me put to you then a Question or two more.—Is not Honesty either some certain Power in the Mind, or some certain Knowledge, or Both together? Is it not necessary, that true inward Honesty should be One or Other of These?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

If Honesty then be some Power in the Mind, does not Honesty inhabit that Mind most, which is possessed of the most Power? And This corresponds with what appeared True to us before, if you remember, — that the Man who had the most Abilities and Powers within him was the Best Man in every Case that we considered.

HIPPIAS.

It did so appear.

SOCRATES.

And if Honesty be some Knowledge in the Mind, does not Honesty reside most in that Mind, which hath the most Know-

the *only End* for which he acts; and that no Man can possibly pursue, will, or aim at *his own Evil*, fully and clearly *knowing* it to be what it is; nor help aiming at, willing, and pursuing what *upon the Whole* he determines to be *for Himself the Best*. The *Will* therefore in all these Cases must of Necessity follow, or rather accompany, the *Judgment*. See Note 143.

Knowledge, and is the Wisest? and is not, in such Case, that Mind the most Dishonest, which is the most undisciplined and ignorant? — But if Honesty should arise from Knowledge and Power, meeting Both together in the same Mind, is not that Mind, which is the best furnished with Both, with Knowledge and Power, the most filled with Honesty? and are not the greatest Degrees of Ignorance⁵⁵ and Impotence in the Mind Parents of the greatest Villany? — Must not these Things through Necessity be so?

HIPPIAS.

So indeed they appear.

SOCRATES.

Did it not appear before, that a Man of the most Knowledge and Wisdom, as well as of the most Abilitys and Powers, was the Best Man, and the most capable of performing either well or ill, at his own Pleasure, in every Operation.

HIPPIAS.

It did.

SOCRATES.

Such a Man therefore, whenever he performs any thing ill, does it with Design; does it through his Powers and his Knowledge. Now 'tis evident, that on These Honesty depends, either on Both of them, or at least on One or Other.

HIP-

⁵⁵ That, in the Greek Text, after the Words *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεσία*, the Words *καὶ ἀδυναμία* ought to be inserted, will be evident to Every one, who knows how to reason, and in what Part an Argument is defective.

HIPPIAS. Knowledge, and is the most honest Mind that is in the World.
Probably it does.

SOCRATES.—
'Tis farther evident, that acting dishonestly is doing ill;
and that acting honestly is doing well.

HIPPIAS. Both with Knowledge and without.
Clearly so.

SOCRATES.—
Will not that Man then, whose Mind is the most filled
with Honesty and Virtue, whenever he shall do any dishonest
or base Action, do it through Choice and with Design?
but the Man, whose Mind is Evil and Dishonest, will not
He be guilty of villainous and base Actions through unavoidable
Necessity?

HIPPIAS.—
So it appears.

SOCRATES.—
Is not a Good Man, one whose Mind is Good and Honest?
and is not He a Bad Man, whose Mind is Evil and Dishonest?

HIPPIAS.—
Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.—
It belongs to the Good Man therefore, to act dishonestly
through free Choice; to the Bad Man, without free Choice
and through unavoidable Necessity; — if it be True, that
the Mind of a Good Man is Good.

HIPPIAS.

And That certainly is True.

SOCRATES.

The Man therefore, who does wrong, and is guilty of villainous and base Actions wilfully and out of free Choice, —⁵⁶ if Such a Man there be, Hippias,—he can be no Other than the Good Man.

HIP-

⁵⁶ Meaning, that the Supposition was absurd. See the *Argument*, page 9. *Plato* here presents us with a Key to this Dialogue, opening it so easily, and letting us into the Secret of it so freely, that every unprejudiced Mind may well wonder, how it came to be so greatly misunderstood, as it will appear to have generally been, if any of our Readers will take the Pains to examine the Annotations and Comments on it, written by the Moderns. But the Wonder will cease, on reflecting what unphilosophical and vulgar Notions concerning *the Freedom of the Will* have generally prevailed in *Europe* ever since the Extinction of those ancient Schools of Philosophy which once inlightened it. Hence it has come to pass, that Learned Men, involved in the common Prejudices, have understood all the Passages of ancient Authors, relating to this Point, in a Sense favorable to their own Notions. For Error, that Disease of the Mind, resembles in this respect certain Diseases in the Humours of the Body; it imparts somewhat of its own Flavor, and gives a Tinge of its own Colour, to every Object of the Taste or Sight which is so diseased. Those Prejudices on the Point in Question, and the Consequences of them, here complained of, are evidently seen in the late Mr. *Jackson's Defence*, as he is pleased to term it, of *Human Liberty*. For that learned Man appears to have had a Heart purer and clearer than his Head; and therefore cannot be supposed to have misrepresented the Sense of those ancient Authors, whom he cites, *knowingly and wilfully*. The Truth seems to be, that overmuch Zeal, tho' in a good Cause, that of Theism, so far blinded him, as well as some Greater Men before him, that he thought he saw a Similitude

HIPPIAS.

I know not, Socrates, how I can grant you this.

SOCRATES.

Nor can I easily grant it to my Self, Hippias. It must, however, of Necessity appear True to us Both at present, having been proved by the Force of our present Argument. — But, as I said before, with regard to this Point⁵⁷ my Mind

militude between Two Hypotheses, quite different and even opposite; —the One, that of a *Material* or *Mechanical Necessity*, maintained by Mr. *Hobbes* and by the Author of *Cato's Letters*, an Hypothesis utterly inconsistent with the Doctrine of an all-directing Mind in Nature; —the Other, that of a *Rational* or *Moral Necessity*, no less inconsistent with Atheism, and necessarily connected with the Idea of a *Governor of the Universe, ruling as well the Rational Part of it, as the rest, not by meer Will, but Wisdom.* For if those only Rational Motives are not cogent to Man, and he is not of Necessity obliged to follow the Appearances of Good, but is by Nature referred afterwards to some other Power within him, called Will, distinct from Reason, and able to controul it, than is meer Will, in Man, and for aught we can tell, in Nature too, a Principle higher and more Divine than Reason.

⁵⁷ See Note 389. Should there be any Man now, after all, who is inclined to think, that *Socrates* thro' this whole Conversation was but in *Jest*, and meant nothing serious;—or that, like the Sophists, he used *fallacious* Arguments, with a villainous *Intent* to impose on the Understandings of the Company, by *confounding Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong*;—or should Any imagine, with *Serranus*, that the Philosopher had no other End in View, than meerly to *confute* or *puzzle Hippias*, and expose him to Ridicule;—or should there possibly be some Other, who follows *Ficinus* in fancying, that his secret Meaning was the very Reverse of that which We have represented it to be in the *Argument*, and contended for in the *Notes*; for that the *Will* was *independant* of the *Judgment* or *Understanding*; and Vice was owing neither to Impotence,

Mind is driven backward and forward continually, and never remains long in the Same Opinion. Indeed there is nothing wonderful in the Case, that I should wander in Uncertainty ; or that any Other Man should, who is only One of the Multitude. But if You Wise Men should run in the same perplexed Mazes, This must be to Us a heavy Misfortune ; since we could never in This Case, even though we applied to You, be freed from our Perplexitys.

nor Ignorance, nor Both together, but to *Malice* only or *Perverseness* in the *Will* ; and that *Socrates* himself embraced, as truly Philosophical, this *Distinction of the Forum*, received in After-Ages by the pretended *Followers of Aristotle* ; but that he left it forsooth for *Hippias* to distinguish thus nicely, on Purpose to show the *Ignorance* of that Sophist if he did it not ;—should any of our Readers be apt to entertain any of these Notions, on account of the *Strangeness* of the *Paradox* advanced or insinuated in this Dialogue, we shall content our selves with observing, that, *strange* as it may seem, 'tis intirely consonant with the Doctrine of *Socrates*, as delivered to us by *Plato* in many other of his Writings. This was so notorious to the Ancients, that *Arrian* in his *Dissertations of Epictetus*, L. 1. C. 28. and L. 2. C. 22. and *Marcus Antoninus*, L. 7. §. 63. cite the Authority of *Plato* to confirm the Truth of this Doctrine. The principal Passages in our Author, where he inculcates it expressly and openly, have been collected by *Gataker* in his *Annotations on Antoninus*, pag. 286 and 399. and by our late learned Friend Mr. *Upton* in his *Notes on Arrian*, pag. 91. Above all, see *Alcinous*, *Introduct.* C. 23. where his Account of the *Platonic* Doctrine upon this Subject seems to be chiefly extracted from this Dialogue, and shows that he understood it exactly in the same Sense with Us.

